tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-66586497321334140522024-03-05T18:44:25.003-08:00Doubt RestsThoughts rarefied, philosophickal, sceptical, illusory, scientifical, & otherwise.diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.comBlogger74125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-70818907585469870172012-07-05T13:35:00.001-07:002012-07-05T13:35:08.199-07:00Musings on RebirthRebirth, let us say, is that which occurs when an autonomous entity takes actions to arrange matter into a self-sustaining replica of its own pattern. In mammals, the actual "birthing" process is that which occurs when the newly fashioned pattern physically emerges from within the host entity, becoming independent, to some degree. But let us use "rebirth" in its more general, metaphor-inclusive sense.<br />
<br />
"Rebirth" can also refer to the revival, renewal, or reactivation of an autonomous entity after a period of dormancy, rather than the creation of a separate replica <i>per se</i>. <span style="background-color: white;">Plants die yet are reborn each year, in a sense. Aside from the specific "annual" species, which literally do die each year, all season-responsive plants undergo changes that mimic death and rebirth throughout the year, just as with the hibernation cycle of many animals, and indeed, with the periodic alternation between activity and rest that all animals experience.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white;">Rebirth is what keeps things vivacious.</span>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-41867535696945106262011-04-17T22:05:00.000-07:002011-04-18T16:17:15.844-07:00The Power of FlexibilityAll doctrines which rely upon ancient authority are doomed to obsolescence.<div><br /></div><div>As an example, one of the most important advantages that a scientific outlook has over a religion-based one is its <i>ability to admit it was wrong; </i>that is, science has the ability to self-correct over time.* A venerable, successful religious tradition may have the weight of centuries behind it to speak in its favor; but that weight simultaneously forever hinders it, keeping it chained or rooted, as it were, in one spot. New scientific discoveries, however, can upset essentially any scientific knowledge that had preceded them, as long as the new theories and frameworks are compelling enough. It's hardly an overnight process--see the 20th century's resistance to quantum mechanics as an example--but science can "afford" to throw out anything as long as it has a suitable, stronger replacement. (It tends to be a further requirement that new discoveries explain old observations and show why old theoretical laws worked, of course.) Christianity, by contrast, cannot afford to throw out the belief that Jesus Christ was God's son, that he spoke God's words, that God's words are trustworthy, that our present texts are accurate reproductions of the originals, and all that. If one removes Christ from Christianity, the belief system reverts to Judaism. (Probably, that is; I'm sure this oversimplifies matters, but I think that's okay for my purposes. On the other hand, if they're fine leaving a large chunk of things unexplained, Christians could probably throw out most of the Old Testament without a problem; I personally suspect they'd be better off if they did so, but that's a discussion for another time.)<div><br /></div><div>However, religious views don't <i>have</i> to be static, in a sense. Thanks to the exquisitely ambiguous nature of language and humanity's marvelous propensity for inventing alternative explanations, a faith's <i>interpretations</i> may change, while their holy sources remain unchanged. As science continues to undermine religious claims, this will more and more become the refuge of believers--that is, unless the public at large continues to ignore scientific knowledge whenever and wherever it pleases. As evolution attains greater and greater acceptance, Judeo-Christians turn toward interpreting <i>Genesis </i>in some kind of metaphoric or allegorical sense. (The future may yet hold some revision for the specifics of evolution, maybe even a somewhat drastic reconceptualization of it; but at the least, I'm very confident that there is no way a literal reading of the story of Creation can be true. Even if evolution is somehow radically undermined, it will be replaced by a theory very similar to it, and regardless, this theory will never accord with <i>Genesis </i>in a literal way.)</div><div><br /></div><div>This illustrates the necessity of fluidity and open-mindedness in a world-view, even where non-scientific projects are concerned.** Science, philosophy, and flexible religious interpretations have the advantage over immutable fundamentalist faith because, well, all human knowledge is pretty fragile and subject to revision.‡ The times they are a-changin', and blind, continual adherence to any systems or traditions means being left in the dust.</div><div><br /></div><div>This post isn't about religion, really; it's about one's ability and willingness to adapt to that which is new and unfamiliar. Faith's resistance to scientific (and social/moral, for that matter) developments is only a conspicuous example of failing to do so that's been strung out through history. In this post, I don't think I've covered very well just <i>why</i> adapting to new changes is desirable, but I hope that's intuitively obvious/self-evident to the reader.</div><div><br /></div><div>The lesson to take away from this is a reminder not to get stuck in your ways, especially as the rate of social and technological change accelerates in today's world. <a href="http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2184#comic">This comic</a>, though humorous, points out what could be a genuinely serious issue, as medical science extends the human lifespan.</div><div><br /></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">{</span></div><div><i><span class="Apple-style-span">Zach Weiner's "Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal", #2184. Transcript:</span></i></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">NARRATOR: Good thing: someday, longevity will be discovered.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">MAN: I'm gonna live forever!</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">NARRATOR: Bad thing: imagine having to deal with an ancestor from the 13th century.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">13TH CENTURY MAN, TO IRRITATED MODERN WOMAN: We need to put a sticker in every astronomy text! The Copernican view is <i>just a theory!</i></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">NARRATOR: Good thing: if it's discovered in your lifetime, you get to be the crazy ancestor.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">FUTURISTIC MAN W/ WIFE: Great Great Great Great Great Great Great Great Grandpa! Stop using your ultraglasses to stare at my wife's boobs!</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">OLD MAN W/ FUTURISTIC GLASSES: That's how we did in the 21st century and I'm too old to change!</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">}</span></div><div><br /></div><div>It is a sad fact that change happens most quickly and easily when an older generation dies out, and a newer generations's views become dominant. I think we want to avoid the "old racist/sexist/homophobe syndrome" at all costs; so it will be imperative that, if we do ever extend the human lifespan to much longer lengths, we do so with a society (a species, really) that is willing to be flexible and to adapt. (A global, or even nation-wide, shift in human thought is far too optimistic to hope for in reality, unfortunately, but we should strive toward that ideal nonetheless.)</div><div><div><div><br /></div><div>Finally, let me supply a quote from Charles S. Peirce (I forget from where, exactly: it's in one of the <i>Collected Papers</i>):</div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; color: rgb(51, 51, 51); font-size: 11px; line-height: 15px; "><span class="Apple-style-span"></span></span></div><blockquote><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; color: rgb(51, 51, 51); font-size: 11px; line-height: 15px; "><span class="Apple-style-span">When doubt ceases, mental action on [a] subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.<br /></span></span></div><div></div></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>---</div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">* Forgive me for encouraging unnecessary dichotomies by pitting a "scientific" mindset against a "religious" one as though they were mutually exclusive, but I'm talking specifically about religious views that look to ancient texts and doctrines as sources of unchanging truth, in defiance of modern scientific discoveries.</span></div><div> </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span">** It amuses me that I follow dogmatic tendentious assertions about the falsity of <i>Genesis</i> with urgings toward "fluid" and "open minded" beliefs. There's some tension here: I will admit, yeah, it's possible something new could shake that ardent disbelief of mine. I just believe that possibility so unlikely as to be not worth discussing or considering as a serious option.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span"></span>‡ Mathematical and logical truths may be an exception, but we must keep in mind that we can still be <i>wrong</i> about those truths due to misunderstanding them. At least, the more complicated ones. Furthermore, I'm sort of a formalist/constructivist hybrid, and I think that logical and mathematical necessity is necessary simply because we define it that way, except perhaps at the barest level. (Is it possible for a thing to not be itself? No, that's merely playing a game with semantics. I don't think all philosophical problems can be explained as nonsense-disguised-as-something-intelligible <i>a la</i> early Wittgenstein and the positivists; but for the most fundamental of logical questions, I do.)</div><div><br /></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 11px; line-height: 15px;"><br /></span></span></div></div></div></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-91966240995735279882011-02-26T20:41:00.001-08:002011-04-18T00:43:54.401-07:00Punishment and Justice<span class="Apple-style-span" >What should we do with those who commit heinous crimes? What about those who commit minor crimes?</span><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" >Punishment as a deterrent--like any overt deterrent, I suppose--functions as a threat. If you misbehave, you will be hurt or slain, or something will be taken from you. Yet that isn't where punishment ends, psychologically: people feel a rage towards particularly vile criminals, a rage that is more of a bloodlust or "righteous" fury than anything else. In these moments, the thinking is not, "We must make a warning to keep others from doing this", but rather, "That bastard must <i>pay!"</i></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><i></i>Someone who hurts others deserves to be hurt themselves. When paired with the view that those who do good deserve good themselves, this sentence is a very near relative to the Golden Rule. We see the sentiment naturally manifested in the Judeo-Christian punishment of sinners and reward of believers, and indeed, in Jesus's famous explicit formulation of the Golden Rule. Hinduism's principle of karma is another example; even if it's not seen as a "punishment" per se by the Hindus, clearly it stems from the same sort of thinking. More recently, the neo-Pagan/<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicca">Wiccan </a>Rule of Three tells us that our decisions, beneficent or maleficent, will be visited upon us again, with threefold consequences.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" >Nietzsche described the general punishment urge in depressingly incisive terms: </span></div><div><blockquote><span class="Apple-style-span" >... to what extent can suffering be a compensation for “debts”? To the extent that <i>making</i> someone suffer provides the highest degree of pleasure, to the extent that the person hurt by the debt, in exchange for the injury as well as for the distress caused by the injury, got an extraordinary offsetting pleasure: <i>creating</i> suffering—a real <i>celebration</i>, something that, as I’ve said, was valued all the more, the greater it contradicted the rank and social position of the creditor. [1]</span></blockquote><span class="Apple-style-span" >I would quibble with him here about harming others being "the highest degree of pleasure" for most people, but I think the general gist of this passage is right. Causing others to suffer, in certain contexts, brings pleasure which is supposed to "make up" for wrongs perpetrated against oneself. (If "pleasure" is too strong a word, then "satisfaction" may be substituted, though mayhap that sugarcoats the situation too much.)</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" >Considered less aesthetically and more economically, as it were, one gets the impression that there exists some metaphysical balance or scale, upon which doing wrong tilts the scale; and this tilting <i>must be accounted for. </i>"Harm" or "hurt" is the currency being weighed here, and so a person (or, more usually, a government) does what would normally be "wrong" to a criminal, and thus the upset scale is righted. </span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span class="Apple-style-span">When generalized and made normative, we call this meting out of harm for harm "justice". For Western culture, Lady Justice (Justitia) symbolizes the concept quite plainly: she carries a scale of judgment and a sword, the first for determining where and how much harm to dole out, and the second for applying it. In "civilized" societies, now that we feel a conflict between wanting wrongdoers to suffer and squeemishness about the dirty work that that entails, we do not directly apply punishments ourselves; instead, we license a certain body of people--viz., the government and its police force--to enact the tenets of justice, which is to say, the tenets of reciprocity. Not literal reciprocity in the sense of an eye for an eye, of course; we are sufficiently advanced that we can invent substitutes and equivalents such as fines and imprisonment. Or, in some dire cases, the punishment probably exceeds the crime quite excessively</span><span class="Apple-style-span">.</span></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span class="Apple-style-span">Actually, the vast majority of crimes don't incite much ire (bloodlust) in the average citizen, because the vast majority of crimes are misdemeanors that do not directly harm individuals.[2] J</span><span class="Apple-style-span">ay walking; smoking cigarettes in a non-smoking area; smoking marijuana; downloading and sharing copyrighted material illegally on the internet; most other forms of copyright infringement; violating the terms of agreement in a competition or an online game by cheating; minor speeding or another small traffic offence; violating a zoning ordinance, that sort of thing. While opponents of drug use agree </span><span class="Apple-style-span">abstractly </span><span class="Apple-style-span">that smoking marijuana deserves punishment, I do not think they actively feel rage when they see or hear of such use, as long as it is not, say, "contributing to their children's delinquency". Players of an online game may feel that cheaters should be banned from the game--and in a fit of passion, perhaps more than that--but they typically do not believe that cheaters should be fined or locked up. (Indeed, perhaps these aren't even "misdemeanors" or "infractions", although most of the time legal agreements have clearly been broken.)</span></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" >Along the continuum of wrongdoing, two things influence a bloodthirsty <i>emotional</i> reaction: personal impact, which is to say, how much an individual is personally affected by it, and severity or depravity of the crime. The former is more of a selfish thing, perhaps, insofar as we tend to care less about vandalism when it is not our very own property or part of a public space we care about. The latter is more universal or normative insofar as we can be riled up by hearing about child molesters, serial killers, or any perpetrator who inspires serious revulsion in us in spite of our own lack of personal investment in the matter.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span class="Apple-style-span">[1] <i>The Genealogy of Morals, </i>more specifically the online edition <a href="http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/nietzsche/genealogy2.htm">here</a>, because I'm lazy. Second essay, </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: 13px; line-height: 19px; ">§6.</span></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 19px; " >[2] "Misdemeanor" may not be the appropriate legal term here. "Infraction" or "regulatory offence" might be better. I should also add that whether another person is directly harmed or not can be argued in each of the following examples, but hopefully you can put that aside or mentally substitute your preferred examples as necessary.</span></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-11824649930641449012011-02-12T02:27:00.000-08:002011-02-12T09:32:57.111-08:00That Initial ImpulseA common focus among my posts on this blog is that of the need for a ground (or substrate), broadly construed, upon which other concepts or items may be "built". Indeed, the name of this blog itself indicates as much; part of its meaning comes from a statement of Wittgenstein's in <i>On Certainty</i>: "Doubt rests upon that which is beyond doubt."<div><br /></div><div>In epistemology, we want a fundamental, solid basis for knowledge: the indubitable, or the undoubtable. Analogously, in metaphysics, we have the need for <i>something</i> that sit in the spot of "prime mover": an uncaused cause (<i>causa sui</i>), the First Cause, God. In ethics, we need to know what can possibly justify objective moral imperatives when every value judgment is, apparently, subjective. (To refer to this notion of a "first thing" in general, I will use the general term "ultimate ground".)<div><br /></div><div>In a digression, I note that these problems are not what typically occupy philosophers as professionals. I don't mean that <i>the whole of each field in philosophy drives only toward finding an ultimate ground.</i> Rather, while a philosopher's personal sense of ultimate grounds or justifications may be upset when she first begins studying skepticism and/or thinking critically about her own experience, usually this problem is eventually settled or ignored in favor of "higher level" concerns later on. There may be good reason for that: once you cover the basics, is there a lot else to say? And there is certainly no shortage of richer philosophical veins to mine elsewhere, once you accept something as given, like, "We do have knowledge of some sort, even if it is not and cannot be 'perfect'", or "Ethical systems can be evaluated in <i>some</i> kind of objective way", etc. Yes, maybe the skeptics are right that nothing meets their impeccably high standards, but that doesn't suddenly render thought, learning, and acting useless.</div><div><br /></div><div>My main point--which may end up taking less time to say than the above digression--is that there is an analogous apparent absence within our psyches with respect to personal agency. At least, within <i>my</i> psyche: perhaps the rest of you are different. Anyhow, when I introspect, I notice a distinction between mental activity that feels constitutive of me as an individual person, and that which seems more incidental (or "accidental", if you like). For example, the thoughts I hold now, the ones inspiring these very words, fit the former category. The sensations from external (and some internal) stimuli that I experience at every moment fit the latter category, e.g., my experience of a glowing screen upon which words appear.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, the thing that strikes me as highly peculiar is the palpable lack of an ultimate ground in all of this. For incidental experiences, that makes sense: most or all of them originate from outside of me, so I can safely presume that any such ground lies "out there" as well. But when it comes to constitutive (we might also say integral) mental activity, I have a very strong sense of <i>personal agency</i> and thus <i>responsibility</i>; that is to say, I subjectively feel like "I" am the origin of such things. When I make a decision, any kind of conscious decision, I <i>feel</i> like I am a mini prime mover (c.f. Chisholm on free will and unmoved movers). But, in fact, under scrutiny, I can find no ultimate ground within me for decision nor motivation. Even though I feel in control of myself, even though I feel that I am the "first" in a chain of causality or what-have-you, closer inspection reveals no such basis within me.</div></div><div><br /></div><div>And that strikes me as unusual.</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-14487591181230962932011-01-13T15:55:00.000-08:002011-01-13T20:28:07.352-08:00Hunting ContradictionsIn the context of time (temporality), change may be characterized by a fact or state of affairs holding at some time t which does not hold at some other time t'. That is to say, at t=0, proposition P is true; but at t+1, P is not true. From this, we may say time "allows" a contradiction (P&~P) to exist by <i>spreading it out: </i>the conflicting natures of P and ~P may coexist as long as they are "side by side" and not in the "same place", temporally.<div><br /></div><div>With the above scare-quotes, I meant to emphasize the use of spatial metaphor in characterizing time; and this leads directly to the other pathway toward contradiction. A proposition and its contrary may exist simultaneously if they are separated from one another spatially; and this is such a natural part of existence that we hardly ever think of it. Expressed more intuitively, this simply means that <i>things are different</i>, when you look around yourself. The universe is not 100% homogeneous. Expressed a bit more formally, we say that (P&~P) can obtain at one and the same time t, <i>if</i> P and ~P occur respectively in different spatial regions.</div><div><br /></div><div>In short, I am saying that contradictions are apparently possible when they are separated by space or time; that is, when they do not share identical space-time coordinates. </div><div><br /></div><div>A counter question, however, is whether these are really "contradictions" if specified precisely enough. Suppose one says, "The space-time point (x,y,z,t) is [tense-lessly] filled (by some entity)".* If one pose against it the statement, "The space-time point (x,y,z,t) is empty", there is nowhere left "to go" in order to escape contradiction. To allow contradictions, according to my foregoing claims, one proposition must vary in time or space from another; but since we have exactly specified identical space-time coordinates, the contradiction is impossible. (This follows, at least in spirit, Quine's comments on temporal logic.) </div><div><br /></div><div>* <span class="Apple-style-span" >I seem to recall that some philosopher or other popularized the use of several tense-less terms and syntaxes, but I have no idea who it was or what the details of it are, now. I would be much obliged if anyone could point me in the right direction.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>So, in response to the above question, I actually must agree: if we prevent them from "colliding", contradictions aren't really contradictions after all. This is trivially true, and hardly new information, but I like to think I have presented a slightly different framework for thinking about the matter.</div><div><br /></div><div>A more interesting question might be, "Does this apply to <i>all</i> propositions?" I think the answer must be an assured "No", because not all propositions have to do with space-time per se, and thus this avenue of approach is not available. For example, "1=1" seems to be a general claim, without reference to <i>any</i> particulars, and it is hard to see how we could situate such a claim in the above schemes. </div><div><br /></div><div>I think we can fairly safely conclude that a "robust" or fully specified contradiction is impossible, simply by definition; but we may be led to wonder whether there aren't other "channels" beyond the four of space-time which one might slide along to allow apparent contradictions. It strikes me that, should we ever somehow <i>encounter</i> a "real life contradiction" or paradox (whatever that would be like), we could, and likely would, posit a new channel of metaphorical space in which the contradictory elements could be separated. (We may speak of these as "dimensions", but I am cautious of using that word thanks to its abuse by overly enthusiastic New Age sorts and science fiction writers.)</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-40740870352444446672010-07-24T09:12:00.000-07:002010-08-31T07:18:57.399-07:00A Somewhat Angsty Phenomenological Take on RealityWhat is real? "Real" is that which imposes metaphysical order on all of our capacities (faculties) <i>without our consent</i>; and it is that which, furthermore, has the power to end our consciousness permanently.<div><br /></div><div>I admit, it's not a terribly clear characterization.</div><div><br /></div><div>Perhaps a simpler way to say it is, "From the personal perspective, the bare minimum of identifiably objective reality consists of that which is not amenable to change through our actions."</div><div><br /></div><div>Still a problematic assertion. After all, I can never control another being's thoughts the way I can control my own--do we say that those thoughts are part of objective reality? Are their personal sensations a part as well?</div><div><br /></div><div>I would say not, although the fact of their having those sensations is obviously an objective fact. It is the representational content of their sensations that may not map perfectly onto reality, e.g. when they are dreaming, imagining, or hallucinating. (That is to say, their experiences at a given moment may not be veridical.)</div><div><br /></div><div>More confusingly, it might seem that we <i>can</i> change many things that we normally think of as objective. E.g., it is an objective fact that the brick wall over there is red (which we may translate to language that makes less use of second-order properties: "the wall over there reflects a majority of light with such and such a wavelength", for example). But, I can change that fact through my personal actions, by painting it green. So was it never an objective fact that the wall was red, after all?</div><div><br /></div><div>Not exactly. I'm trying to get at something a little more fundamental. While it is true that you can change an object's color by painting it, you nevertheless cannot violate the laws of physics nor logic in doing so. With that in mind, what I'm saying seems to be this: the fundamental "building blocks" of reality, from a personal perspective, are <i>impossibilities</i>, which is to say, <i>invariants</i>.</div><div><br /></div><div>Hmmm....</div><div><br /></div><div>This is still a very problematic description.</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-37135090831311787342010-06-27T17:38:00.000-07:002010-06-27T17:46:50.599-07:00More About People Misjudging Themselves<a href="http://philosophycompass.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/dont-ask-me-ask-my-brain/">The Philosopher's Eye reports:</a><div></div><blockquote><span><span>Chances are, you will be a less reliable indicator of your own behavior than a brain scan will...</span></span><div><span><span></span></span><br /><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style=" color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 16px; font-family:'Lucida Grande', Verdana, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:12px;"><i></i></span></div><span><span>... [A] research team, led by Matthew Lieberman, a psychology professor at UCLA, had subjects watch a public service announcement about the benefits of sunscreen while in an fMRI machine. The researchers looked for an increase in activity of the medial prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain associated with values, preferences, and self-reflection. Then, the researchers asked the subjects how likely they were to use more sunscreen during the upcoming week. After one week, the subjects were asked how often they ended up using sunscreen.</span></span></div><div><span><span><br /></span></span></div><div><span><span>What the researchers found was that the subjects who showed an increase in medial prefrontal cortex activity were 75% more likely to use sunscreen, whereas the subjects who self-reported the intention to use more sunscreen were only about 50% more likely to do so. Thus, the researchers had better information about how the subjects would behave during the upcoming weeks than the subjects themselves.</span></span></div></blockquote><div><span><span></span></span><div></div></div><div><a href="http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/30/25/8421">Here is a link to the original research</a><span> (also found in the Philosopher's Eye page, of course.)</span></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-3855210792683712642010-05-24T16:46:00.000-07:002010-05-24T17:33:09.394-07:00Thinking vs ActingI still don't understand exactly the "internal" difference between <i>doing</i> and just..... thinking about doing. Imagining it.<div><br /></div><div>If I now intend to make a physical action, such as wiggle one of my toes, there's something happening in my mind that precedes that action--an anticipatory "planning" or intention stage. (If I remember correctly, studies by Benjamin Libet suggest that <i>we</i> don't even become conscious of our brain's decision to initiate an action until some 200-500ms after our brain starts setting it in motion.) But I can think about wiggling a toe without actually doing it--in fact, that's what I'm doing now as I make these observations, and what you the reader will likely be doing as these words call forth involuntary recollections in your mind. I can <i>imagine</i> wiggling a toe, even. Since most of us are such visual creatures, this will probably be first and foremost a mentally created image of my own toe wiggling (somehow); as I add detail to the imagining, I can recall the other sensations that accompany such a feat: the quale of my toe shifting position, the accompanying movement of my skin, the small shifts in texture or whatever that my skin will register if my movement causes it to encounter new surfaces/objects, etc.</div><div><br /></div><div>I can even try to mentally re-create (simulate) the very <i>willing</i>, or whatever it is, that causes genuine movement. I can do this at a somewhat intuitive level, I think, but I feel I have a very poor grasp on what is actually happening. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now, the curious thing about my imaginings here, is that <i>imagining</i> itself is another type of action; so, while I'm tinkering with how my mind translates thought into action, I am meanwhile doing just that in order to "experiment" at all. (Proper scientists will be horrified to here such phenomenological investigation referred to as "experimentation", but hey, I'm not talking about proper scientific experiments in this context.) </div><div><br /></div><div>It seems that there is always some kind of buffer or gap that I cannot quite cross here.<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span></div><div><br /></div><div><br /><div><br /></div><div><br /></div></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-2941769312552270382010-02-06T18:36:00.001-08:002010-02-06T18:38:23.443-08:00Probably makes me laugh more than it ought to have<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(41, 48, 59); "><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(41, 48, 59); ">A parenthetical comment in a <a href="http://blogandnot-blog.blogspot.com/2010/02/some-more-stuff-about-analyticsynthetic.html">recent blog post from Ben Burgis</a>:</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(41, 48, 59); "><br /></span></div><blockquote>Some friends of mine have this very nerdy running joke about starting a bar called "The Two Dogmas Of Alcoholism." We'd serve a shot called "The Analytic" and a shot called "The Synthetic" and both of them would be Jose Cuervo. When patrons had one of each and then asked what the difference was, the bar-tenders would all be trained to respond with, "ex-actly!"</blockquote>I'd be a fan.</span>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-41570369069261112742009-11-30T22:30:00.000-08:002009-11-30T23:28:47.009-08:00Opaque IntrospectionSome time ago, Psyblog posted a series called <a href="http://www.spring.org.uk/2008/01/what-everyone-should-know-about-their.php">"What Everyone Should Know About Their Own Minds"</a>. Appropriately enough, it covers different ways in which humans typically completely misunderstand (or misjudge) components of their own behavior such as motivations, reasons, and predictions about their own responses. Sometimes this involves resolving cognitive dissonance, where a subject changes some of her beliefs in order to better match other beliefs they had been opposing; other times the explanation is less clear.<div><br /></div><div>The whole subject is a curious one, since, subjectively, most of us <i>feel</i> like we have pretty transparent access to the inside of our own heads. For example, if asked to give reasons why we find one face more attractive than another, we usually think we can do so so; and we feel moreover that the reasons we come up with will be true to whatever processes actually go on inside our heads. Not so, as <a href="http://www.spring.org.uk/2007/12/at-heart-of-attraction-lies-confusion.php">one of the Psyblog posts</a> reports; at least not with the accuracy that we'd think we would have.</div><div><br /></div><div>My impression is that we are sometimes alien to our own minds, insofar as we don't understand most of our inner machinations. Yet, strangely, we have this need to "tell stories", even to ourselves, about why we've done things a particular way: a need for explanation or justification of our <i>inner</i> landscape, much in the fashion of the need that we have to explain (and understand) the outer world. This isn't such a bad thing, since seeking explanations is the heart of science (and rational inquiry). But it does emphasize the necessity of being relentlessly critical and skeptical if your aim is truth -- skeptical even about your own thought processes -- lest you settle too firmly on the first story that seems plausible to you.</div><div><br /></div><div>A downside of the above skeptical strategy, in my own experience, is that it tends to drive you a little bit crazy. Constantly doubting your own motivations, values, judgments, and ostensible motivations is not a very enjoyable way to go about your day. After a certain point, if you lose too much faith in your own understanding with regard to the contents of your own head, you may end up impeding your own progress, due to constantly looking for nonexistent solid ground. From a practical "getting things done" standpoint, it may be better to be wrong about a few little details here and there if you're still able to function well in the main.</div><div><br /></div><div>We may suppose, perhaps, that this was why we did not evolve to be <i>more</i> naturally self-critical and self-reflective creatures. Don't get me wrong, compared to any other form of intelligence that we know about, we still go pretty far toward it -- even the least reflective of individuals tries to purge logical inconsistencies from her thoughts, though the amount of tolerance for inconsistency obviously varies from person to person. But, based on experiments like those linked above, plausible-seeming beliefs about your own motivations were evolutionarily much more relevant to fitness than numerous safeguard mechanisms to ensure internal accuracy. Apparently.</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-85584093556257525112009-11-11T14:04:00.000-08:002009-11-11T14:40:46.550-08:00Markram Speaks On Simulating the Brain<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/webdav/site/bluebrain/shared/Ncc%20500.jpg"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 187px; height: 258px;" src="http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/webdav/site/bluebrain/shared/Ncc%20500.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><br /></div>Henry Markram, director of the <a href="http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/">Blue Brain</a> project, (relatively recently) gave <a href="http://www.ted.com/talks/henry_markram_supercomputing_the_brain_s_secrets.html">a speech at TED</a> about simulating neuron activity of the entire brain. This will require a supercomputer, in this case supplied by IBM, since the brain has some 10<sup>11</sup> neurons. So far, they've replicated a rat's neocortical column, which comprises some 10<sup>4</sup> neurons, and Markram anticipates being able to fully model the human brain within 10 years. <div><div><br /></div><div>One of the curious things that I found in the early part of his talk was how he kept saying "decisions" to refer to activity over which we have no direct control, such as the processing that goes into scaling object size based on distance. I'm not fond of that choice of words, since it seems to suggest that we, as conscious entities, could actually <i>decide</i> to perceive things differently from how we do -- something which should appeal to fans of <a href="http://doubt-rests.blogspot.com/2008/06/interrelationship-between-belief-truth.html">neo-mystical idealism</a>. For that reason, I think it would be better to avoid that kind of terminology to avoid a similar confusion as that which resulted from physicists' choice of the term "observe" to describe a particular type of interaction in quantum mechanics. They (physicists) also started the use of "God particle" to refer to the Higgs boson, which is again misleading to the general public, although I think the media has been more responsible for propagating that usage than any actual scientists.</div><div><br /><div>Curious things, words.</div><div><br /></div></div></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-30688474472105822302009-11-10T04:22:00.000-08:002009-11-10T05:38:26.457-08:00Inquiry Into Impossibility(Briefly).<div>I am a being with desires. Roughly, this means that I, as a sentient system, feel impelled to relieve an urge. So, I create a mental simulation of <i>some thing</i>, some state of affairs that differs from the current state of the world, that I expect (or hope) will alleviate that urge.</div><div>A simple example: Debra is hungry. Instinct and memory tell her that moving her body so as to bring comestibles to her mouth and chew (+ swallow, etc.) will make her less hungry. Thus, her object of desire is a state where she has eaten food, or where her stomach is full, or something to that effect.</div><div>The fundamental principle, as everyone already knows, is that actions modify our environment, and our bodies consequently reward us – with dopamine and the diminishment of urge – through modifying the environment in particular ways.</div><div><br /></div><div>What happens, now, if I desire something impossible?</div><div><br /></div><div>Let me sit and contemplate a bowl of fruit. My desire is for one of the fruit – a mango, perhaps – to be in my hand. I have, then, a clearly defined goal (a simulated aspect of the environment which will sate my want), and all that remains is to use the power of action to translate object of desire into actuality. Common sense says I should move myself within range of the bowl (if I'm not there already), extend an arm, and pick it up. However, my desire is slightly more complex than that: I want to achieve my goal <i>without</i> going through those steps. Part of my envisioned goal includes the condition that I collect the mango in the absence of gross physical movement.</div><div>There might be other options: maybe I have a friend (or servant) nearby who will interpret a very slight gesture on my part as a request for the mango. Or maybe there's a mechanical hand and conveyor belt set up that leads directly to my own biological hand, and it is activated through some minute action – moving my eyes or blinking in a particular pattern, for example.</div><div>But let's say none of these things have been arranged: the most likely situation is that I'm sitting in place alone, unaided, merely <i>willing</i> the mango to somehow appear in my hand through no great effort of my own.</div><div>That this should happen is improbable to the point of impossibility.</div><div>So, I review my options: supposing that I stubbornly stick to my original constraints (no gross physical movement), there is little to nothing that I can do to change the situation. To effect change, action is required; and only a particular subset of available actions leads to particular (desired) outcomes. If the set of actions-available-to-me happens to be disjoint to the set of actions-leading-to-my-goal, it seems I am utterly powerless. There <i>must</i> be overlap between those categories, otherwise it is logically impossible for me to achieve my goal through action.</div><div>Is there any other way to achieve a goal than through action? By the very nature of the word "achieve", I think the answer is no. Is it possible for me to accomplish something while doing nothing? <i>Pace </i>Laozi, the very idea reeks of contradiction. "But," I protest, "I am doing something – I'm <i>thinking</i> and <i>simulating</i>." The problem is that, apparently, thinking and simulating exert no influence on the universe if they are not accompanied by physical forces to realize their aims. Alone, they do not overlap with very many sets of actions-that-lead-to-goals at all.</div><div><br /></div><div>How can I shape the universe to match my desires? Only through the channels that the universe allows me. And so the question becomes, how can I change those channels?</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-30612847899758113572009-11-04T05:11:00.001-08:002009-11-04T05:22:54.244-08:00Science/Philosophy discussion on PFLooks to be <a href="http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/philosophy-and-science-37299.html">a very fascinating discussion about science and philosophy</a> shaping up on the <a href="http://forums.philosophyforums.com/">Philosophy Forums</a>. At least, fascinating for my tastes, since I'm perennially interested in the question of what use philosophy really is these days compared to science.<div><br /></div><div>Anyway, the thread starts out by directing several questions to John Searle (who is actually a member of the forums, although I suspect far too busy to be very active). Searle himself did give one response, but since then the thread's been drawing other participants; nonetheless, so far it has been a high caliber and well-reasoned discussion, by my estimation.</div><div><br /></div><div>Here's a sample to whet your appetite, from the original poster (HamishMacSporran)'s response to Searle's own response:</div><div><blockquote>... [M]any scientists take the view that the scientific revolution was made possible not by an accumulation of philosophical analysis, but instead by a rejection of the existing philosophical systems in favour of a new experimental method. From this point of view, scientists don't need philsophers [sic] to do their groundwork for them, but should instead ignore their clever arguments and focus on doing experiments. Hence the motto of the Royal Society, "Take nobody's word for it".</blockquote><blockquote>...</blockquote><blockquote><br />You [Searle] also raise the issue of computationalism within cognitive science, and your arguments against it. Whatever their merits, these arguments have not led to a conclusive rejection of computationalism. Dennett, for example, continues to deny your conclusions are valid, and the mind as a computer program metaphor continues to be common currency among cognitive scientists.<br /><br />To many scientists this is just another symptom of philosophy's malaise: nothing ever gets resolved. That's why, instead of arguing for another thousand years about whether universals exist, they believe they need to focus on questions that can be definitively answered by experiment, with some even claiming that questions outside this domain are meaningless.<br /><br />Does the computationalist hypothesis really have any experimental implications for cognitive scientists? What effects would you expect your arguments to have on a cognitive scientists research program? Are there benefits of philosophical dispute even in the case that no definite conclusion is reached?</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-7559668119592522102009-10-23T05:41:00.001-07:002010-10-23T16:38:22.525-07:00Philosophy as counter-productive in a therapeutic sense?From Irvin D. Yalom's <i>Existential Psychotherapy</i>:<div><blockquote>As nature abhors a vacuum, we humans abhor uncertainty. One of the tasks of the therapist is to increase the patient's sense of certainty and mastery. It is a matter of no small importance that one be able to explain and order the events in our lives into some coherent and predictable pattern. To name something, to locate its place in a causal sequence, is to begin to experience it as under our control. No longer, then, is our internal experience or behavior frightening, alien or out of control; instead, we behave (or have a particular inner experience) because of something we can name or identify. The '"because" offers one mastery (or a sense of mastery that phenomenologically is tantamount to mastery). [pp. 189-190]</blockquote></div><div>Does the study of philosophy, I wonder, run counter to that need we have for certainty? Or on the contrary, does it perhaps assist it? After all, though philosophy does not provide us with cut-and-dry answers, and its study exacerbates our awareness of the human's dismal epistemic and existential plight, nonetheless any sort of rational investigation (of which philosophy purports to be the discipline <i>par excellance</i>) will invariably encompass the latter part of Yalom's quote, viz., the bit about "naming" and explaining/ordering events.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Ancients make for a good example here: reducing the physical world's phenomena to a limited number of substances--e.g. fire/change for Heraclitus, water for Thales, air for Anaximenes, all four elements for Empedocles--allows the more succinct and manageable comprehension of that world. Rational reductionism of all shades and hues affords a better sense of psychological certainty, and consequently an increased feeling of "mastery". Science, as the eventual granddaughter of this impulse, performs the same function, although our methods have since grown much more mathematical and empirical.</div><div><br /></div><div>But by no means ought we think this strategy unique to science and philosophy. Human mythology is cross-culturally rife with proposed explanations for phenomena ("just so" stories). Tellingly, many of them explicitly exalt the importance of <i>words</i> and <i>naming</i> in the development of humanity. For current Euro-American culture, most obviously we see Adam's naming of the beasts in Genesis. Sigmund Freud asserted that religion attempts to reconcile our needs for control against the volatile chaos of nature: if the natural world is controlled utterly by a superior being who acts as a father for us, we are thus assured that there is order lurking behind ostensible chaos; and, more importantly, it is an order with our own best interests in mind (eventually, that is. Because God's will is inscrutable and ineffable, we must accept that bad things will happen to us in the now). Finally, it is an order which is not set forever in stone, but an order which may be bargained with and appealed to, since it is ruled fundamentally by a <i>person</i> of sorts, not by a blind, unintelligent, and uncaring force. (The "Communication/Negotiation" section of my post <a href="http://doubt-rests.blogspot.com/2008/07/immutability-of-viccisitudes-part-1.html">"The Immutability of Vicissitudes, Part 1"</a> addresses this too.)</div><div><br /></div><div><div>It may in fact be fruitful to analyze the scientific thirst for knowledge in light of psychoanalytical need for control, and I am positive that I'm not the first to suggest this. We might say that science-lust is an extension of Freud's interpretation of religion: science serves similar psychological needs, although it requires a deep paradigm shift as well. The scientific Weltanschauung does not privilege humanity by pretending that the universe operates in humanity's best interest, nor does it offer us a kindly father-figure. However, it does give us an explanation--an understanding of order inherent behind the horrible confusions nature presents us with; and it supplies us, through understanding, with a means to combat our own helplessness.</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, science may be seen nearly as an outgrowth of religion (more properly, the religious impulse); but it is one that replaces an anthropomorphic epistemology with a mechanical epistemology. As Quine said of physical objects and gods, </div><div></div><blockquote><div>Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. ["Two Dogmas of Empiricism"]</div><div></div></blockquote><div>That is to say, we put forth the common understanding of physical objects (as opposed to the skeptic's or the idealist's) as an explanation for our collected observations in the same way that, and for similar reasons as, our ancestors put forth gods. However, gods are not very good explanations and they do not enable us to <i>do</i> things the way that believing in the reality of physical objects do; hence their (physical objects') epistemic superiority.</div><div><br /></div><div>Though we cannot appeal to a God anymore, science does furnish us with a means to control nature ourselves, which is something that religion and mythology could never adequately supply. From this we get the term <a href="http://dresdencodak.com/2009/09/22/caveman-science-fiction/">"playing God"</a> and our species' tradition of shunning technological progress for the power it takes away from God. Now, the contemporary existentially-minded human finds herself sitting down in God's throne after having killed Him, and she finds herself terrified by the loneliness, the lack of direction, and the growing awareness that, if God <i>had</i> ever existed, He wouldn't have been any better off than she is now.</div><div><br /></div></div><div><br /></div><div>So, all respect due to Boethius, is philosophy actually a consolation? Cautiously, I say that it <i>can</i> be; but I hasten to add that stopping there is woefully (and willfully?) near-sighted. Rational inquiry enables us to satisfy some of the needs Yalom detailed above in a similar capacity that religion has served past-ly. Unfortunately, we no sooner find a good reason to believe something than we recognize that there can be no absolute certainty (in a broad sense). Naming (and, these days, quantifying) the surrounding world is a valuable ability, but the relentless and open-eyed pursuit of exhaustive naming schemes leads one to the conclusion that such things are impossible--and that certainty is more so.</div><div><br /></div><div>(It seems to me that Mark Z. Danielewski deals with these themes among others in his novel <i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color:#3333FF;">House</span> of Leaves<span><span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: normal;">, although I may not be able to say exactly how.</span></span></span></i>)</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-62913842830669690892009-09-28T22:07:00.001-07:002009-09-28T22:46:48.533-07:00Link DumpSo here are some blog entries (or whatever) I have recently found interesting.<div><br /></div><div>At Theoretical Atlas, <a href="http://theoreticalatlas.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/recent-talk-gregory-chaitin-mathematics-biology-and-metabiology/">Jeffrey Morton recounts a talk given by Gregory Chaitin where Chaitin urges us to create a more rigorous "theoretical biology".</a> Something where we could prove interesting theorems about evolutionary models, for example.</div><div><br /></div><div>At (Blog&~Blog), <a href="http://blogandnot-blog.blogspot.com/2009/09/quick-thought-about-sylvans-box.html">Ben Burgis writes a bit about Graham Priest's </a><i><a href="http://blogandnot-blog.blogspot.com/2009/09/quick-thought-about-sylvans-box.html">Sylvan's Box</a></i><a href="http://blogandnot-blog.blogspot.com/2009/09/quick-thought-about-sylvans-box.html"> story and the (im)plausibility of drawing conclusions about "real life" logic from the logic that exists in fiction.</a></div><div><br /></div><div><a href="http://www.alanrhoda.net/blog/2009/08/on-misguided-applications-of-excluded.html">Alan Rhoda discusses the Law of Excluded Middle in the context of propositions about the future, responding to an example supplied by David Hunt.</a></div><div><br /></div><div>This is a somewhat older paper (1997) by Allen F. Randall entitled "<a href="http://www.elea.org/Phenomenology/">Quantum Phenomenology</a>". He attempts something of an updated version of Descartes' <i>cogito </i>(maybe mixed with Kant's transcendental project), attempting to logically derive the principles of quantum<span><span> mechanics from the basic awareness of experiential existence (my phrase, not Randall's). Randall claims, "Far from being "bizarre" and "weird", as is usually thought, the strangest paradoxes of quantum theory turn out to be just what one ought to expect of a rational universe." I admit, I've only read the first part of this paper, but it's still a very fascinating idea.</span></span></div><div><br /></div><div><a href="http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2008/07/fart_spray_and_disgust_more_ge.php">At Mixing Memory, Chris reports on several studies</a> where unpleasant stimuli (such as foul odors, messy/sloppy workspaces, disgusting video footage) harshen the severity of people's moral judgments.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-41700783022975254822009-07-04T04:34:00.000-07:002009-07-05T12:57:11.154-07:00Why we're hereIt doesn't seem as though the universe should exist. It is common to think there should be a <i>reason</i>--a truthmaker--for why the universe exists as opposed to not existing.<div>Which is a mighty peculiar thing, since we've certainly never had any observations of a non-existent universe, nor can we even properly imagine it (in my opinion). All we have is the assumption that the pre-natal and natural state of anything is non-existence, or absence; accordingly, there must be <i>something else</i>, some kind of metaphysical mechanism, that causes that non-existence to become existence.</div><div>This stems from our observations about causality, perhaps coupled with innate physical intuitions. Maybe it isn't so peculiar to have this belief, then, since every time that we witness an effect in everyday life, it is preceded (anteceded) by a cause. Hence cosmological arguments; hence the conclusion that there must have been either a single "unmoved mover" or an infinite chain of antecedent causes to explain the universe's existence. Well, that or the universe shouldn't exist at all, being causeless.</div><div>I wonder if we're really justified in this conclusion. We have never witnessed something come from nothing (which is presumably what must have happened when a pure void became material substance?) but then... we have truthfully never witnessed "nothing". As our scientific instruments grow more and more powerful, we end up discovering that even that which has appeared empty before--vacuums, space--is nonetheless filled with a frothing mass of virtual particles and other bizarre fauna of the micro-universe. (See, e.g., <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vacuum_state">this Wikipedia article on the vacuum state</a>).</div><div>And if there is always something there materially... I guess then we have to suppose that those minute, practically non-existent material bits must be able to exert causal influence on other bits of matter. In that case, how can we be sure that it's even physically <i>possible</i> for the universe (or at least matter) not to exist? Maybe it is logically possible, infosofar as we can imagine it (which I have my doubts about, as I said before). Metaphysically possible? Hmmm....</div><div>Consider another Easter egg laid by the goose of science: the first law of thermodynamics. The total amount of energy in an isolated system must remain constant, though it may change form. (Similarly so with physical information, as came up in the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole_information_paradox">black hole information paradox.</a> I believe the conservation of one quantitiy--information or energy--may be derived from the other.) If the universe is an isolated system, and if we presume that this law holds invariably, then we must conclude that the universe has always existed--or rather that the energy within it has always existed, which is close enough for our purposes, since energy may be converted to matter.</div><div>Thus, the laws of physics do not allow the energy of the universe to come into or out of existence--thus, we must presume it has always existed.</div><div>But then, all I'm doing is shifting the question back a step. Now we ask instead, "Why is it that the total energy in the universe equals a positive value, not a zero or negative value?"</div><div>I don't know. Should we expect there to be a <i>reason</i> that gravity exists? That time exists? Some physicists do look for causes there, I suppose. And to a certain degree, we may get explanations about gravity and other forces as they (we think) split off from a single unified source in the very early universe. Still, if we accept that laws or forces need no justification for their existence, maybe we shouldn't expect a justification for the existence of energy either?</div><div><br /></div><div>Edit as of 07-05-2009: I should clarify that under some theories, the total energy of the universe actually <i>does</i> add up to zero; it just that the way it's distributed gives us the material and energy formations we're used to. (I think gravity is typically suggested as the negative counterpart for the energy released during the Big Bang. <a href="http://www.astrosociety.org/pubs/mercury/31_02/nothing.html">Here's a handy and relevant (though brief) link for further reading</a>).</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-74974315141876584862009-06-26T19:02:00.001-07:002009-06-26T22:39:04.227-07:00Controlling oneself<span><span><a href="http://lesswrong.com/lw/11h/controlling_your_inner_control_circuits/">Fascinating post</a> over at <a href="http://www.lesswrong.com/">Less Wrong</a> about the influence of control systems on human behavior, and the role they seem to play in the brain. A control system here basically means a feedback device that catalyzes or inhibits some variable in order to maintain it within an accepted range. (Thermostat, homeostasis, etc.)</span></span><div><br /></div><div><span><span>Here's a lengthy quote that seems most pertinent to me:<br /><blockquote>In a primitive, tribal culture, being seen as useless to the tribe could easily be a death sentence, so we [likely] evolved mechanisms to avoid giving the impression of being useless. A good way to avoid showing your incompetence is to simply not do the things you're incompetent at, or things which you suspect you might be incompetent at and that have a great associated cost for failure. If it's important for your image within the tribe that you do not fail at something, then you attempt to avoid doing that.<br /><br />You might already be seeing where this is leading. The things many of us procrastinate on are exactly the kinds of things that are important to us. We're deathly afraid of the consequences of what might happen if we fail at them, so there are powerful forces in play trying to make us not work on them at all. Unfortunately, for beings living in modern society, this behavior is maladaptive and buggy. It leads to us having control circuits which try to keep us unproductive, and when they pick up on things that might make us more productive, they start suppressing our use of those techniques.<br /><br />Furthermore, the control circuits are stupid. They are occasionally capable of being somewhat predictive, but they are fundamentally just doing some simple pattern-matching, oblivious to deeper subtleties. They may end up reacting to wholly wrong inputs. Consider the example of developing a phobia for a particular place, or a particular kind of environment. Something very bad happens to you in that place once, and as a result, a circuit is formed in your brain that's designed to keep you out of such situations in the future. Whenever it detects that you are in a place resembling the one where the incident happened, it starts sending error signals to get you away from there. Only that this is a very crude and unoptimal way of keeping you out of trouble - if a car hit you while you were crossing the road, you might develop a phobia for crossing the road. Needless to say, this is more trouble than it's worth.</blockquote>(P.S., I should note that the author of the quoted blog post, Kaj_Sotala, draws this conceptual material largely from a <a href="http://thinkingthingsdone.com/signup/TheSelfHelpMyth.pdf">self-help article by PJ Eby</a>).</span></span><div><span><span><br />Fascinating stuff. Maybe not without its problems though, as commenter Silas Barta notes:<br /><blockquote>The explanations here for behavioral phenomena look like commonsense reasoning that is being shoehorned into controls terminology by clever relabeling. (ETA: Why do you need the concept of a "feedback control system" to think of the idea of running through the reasons you're afraid of something, for example?)</blockquote>The thought concerns me a bit too. Are we really getting any benefit from describing these aspects of behavior as control mechanisms? Are we getting a more accurate model of behavior? At an individual, practical level, does it help us to conceive of our thought processes in this way?</span></span></div></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-38103166672346664422009-06-18T02:03:00.000-07:002009-06-18T02:31:16.064-07:00"Following From" AddendumAh, this is a perfect example of why I should actually <i>read</i> philosophical work that has already been done on subjects that I wonder about.<div><br /></div><div>My last post, <a href="http://doubt-rests.blogspot.com/2009/06/following-from.html">Following From</a>, concerned itself (loosely, and among other things) with the nature of metaphysical laws. However, I uncritically assumed a view analogous to the regularity theory of laws of nature--as opposed to the necessitarian theory. That is, I took it for granted that laws (though of course I have in mind metaphysical laws, not just those in the physical world) are simply descriptions of behavior rather than forces which "govern" or "command" objects to act in particular ways.<div><br /></div><div>Yet, while I took the regularity view for granted, I speculated about what it <i>is</i> that "causes" or "makes" things behave the way they do, while at the same time rejecting the necessitarian view which would--we hope--give just that kind of explanation. Now, this isn't really a solution to whatever problem I had in mind, because I would still be inclined to ask of necessitarians, "But what, in turn, makes necessitarian laws hold the sway they do?", thus leading us obnoxiously into a typical infinite regress. But my point is that if I'd already been aware of these existing philosophical positions, and read at least a modicum about them, I would have had a basis from which to work when asking my own questions--it may not have furnished me with answers right off the bat, but I believe that marking this distinction has helped to clarify the matter in my mind.</div><div><div><div><div> </div></div></div></div></div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-70584509906738256492009-06-17T07:18:00.000-07:002009-06-17T07:18:11.655-07:00Following From<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size:small;">[I wish that I had the interest/dedication to actually pursue these thoughts more rigorously by studying existent philosophical work on the topic, but alas.]</span><div><br /></div><div>Consider a state governed by absolutely no physical or metaphysical laws. Does this mean anything can happen? Or for "something to happen", does that require that there be something to guide or direct "happenings"?</div><div><br /></div><div>Natural laws, of course, probably don't "guide" action by any means. They're simply descriptions of how phenomena behave. But... how do phenomena "know" how to behave? What makes them behave in a particular way versus some other way?</div><div><br /></div><div>I suppose I'm inquiring about how causation works in general--what exactly goes on when some observed or postulated event (which we call the antecedent) is supposed to cause, or in some way be responsible for, another event (the consequent). (As a side note, "event" is too loose of a term. Really, I suppose I mean "states of affairs" or "sets of circumstances" that obtain at a certain point in time. But event is a bit quicker to write, and most of the discussion examples that I can think of are events in the more standard sense too.)</div><div><br /></div><div>If nothing else, we can at least say that human minds (and thus what we call rational thought) work best thinking under the following paradigm: to understand how/why a circumstance came to be, the circumstance must have followed from, or been enabled by, a pre-existing framework. {{And it is this necessity of thought unchecked that Kant rebukes in his <i>Critique.</i> The search for the unconditioned condition--a final explanation--the prime mover--God--is an attempt to <i>step outside</i> of the infinite regress that otherwise results, and thus to give us a circumstance which needs no further explanation. Kant (perhaps rightfully) claims that reason oversteps its justifiable boundaries when it tries to make this move.}} This paradigm seems to have served us fairly faithfully so far, but we cannot nonetheless discount the possibility that this fundamental "strategy" of thought might be flawed. {{As you will notice, the current topic is regrettably plagued by difficulty (impossibility?) of discussion. Like many other areas of philosophy, we are trying to grapple with notions that extend into the core of our most basic assumptions, and even trying to <i>think </i>about them will be difficult, much less to question their "accuracy".}}</div><div><br /></div><div>What, however, does any of this mean? The ideas I suggest now may be completely nonsensical, possibly incoherent as well. And surely there is nothing to be gained by indulging nonsense.</div><div><br /></div><div>I believe the question ties into (is enrooted in?) regress and the problem of finding first causes. Which in its own way mirrors the confusing interrelationship between objectivity and subjectivity.</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-4968827076054402742009-06-05T00:05:00.001-07:002009-06-05T00:09:36.520-07:00Systemic TherapyHoly cripes, there's <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemic_therapy">a form of psychotherapy based off of cybernetics / systems theory?</a><div><br /></div><div>Crazy. I doubt it's as cool as it sounds to me, and really I don't even know that much about the aforementioned subjects, but I really like the idea of understanding a psychosocial situation in terms of interacting systems.</div>diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-78114923766809668642009-05-21T03:45:00.000-07:002009-05-21T03:47:24.636-07:00Want? Choice?Why is it so hard to be a particular way <span style="font-style: italic;">by choice</span>?<br /><br />Why is it that I cannot simply decide one day, hey, I want to accomplish X--and then pursue it?<br /><br />Nothing prevents me.<br /><br />Akrasia...?diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-80434122650645561372009-05-16T18:10:00.000-07:002009-05-16T18:18:06.842-07:00Probability - BAH!Yes.<br /><br />Something vaguely bothers me about probability and the overall use of statistics as means for projecting and collecting data. And not just the fact that I find it harder to understand them than I believe I should, considering how comparatively simple their application and execution is.<br /><br />I can't quite articulate what it is yet, and in any case it's likely that my worries here are pretty groundless, as with the concerns I've felt about other aspects of science and mathematics. But hey, the investigation is the fun part, right? And I truly seem to learn the most easily when I'm mentally "assailing" a position: hunting for weak points, discrepancies, internal conflicts, etc.diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-38698938797691713652009-05-01T22:51:00.000-07:002009-05-05T10:15:05.467-07:00Cats and the Qualia of HappinessMy cat, having satisfied himself with the food available indoors, ambles back to the door and sits expectantly. He'll look up at the portal, look around, look at me occasionally. If I draw close, he'll rise up and paw the side of the door, possibly rub himself against me, make movements that seem to express a readiness to go forth. He meows on occasion, if the exit remains barred for too long.<br /><br />As near as I can tell, he experiences a desire to go outside.<br /><br />Would he feel pleasure from his desire being fulfilled, or would he simply feel relief from the pressing urge?diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-67084824587240234432009-04-30T09:53:00.000-07:002009-04-30T10:10:23.984-07:00Why Do People Do Bad Things?A question that has troubled humankind for as long as we've been able to formulate it, no doubt.<br /><br />Let us consider a moral agent, Agent Q. (Not 007, no.)<br />Q commits an immoral act B (B for bad. Or maybe for /b/.).<br /><br />Possibilities:<br /><ol><li>Q performs B because she doesn't know any better. She may have no conception or understanding of morality, or at least not the required kind of morality at hand here. Perhaps she is an animal or mindless drone and not a moral agent at all.<br /></li><li>Q performs B but does not believe it is wrong. This is basically a variation of 2, only now I assume Q does understand why other people might think B is wrong, yet she disagrees. Maybe she's Nietzsche.<br /></li><li>Q believes that B is wrong, yet she wants to benefit from B (in whatever way she does) badly enough to overcome any moral hestitations. She could be Judas, I suppose.<br /></li><li>Q believes that B is wrong and does not think that B's selfish good will outweigh the evil it entails. Somehow, Q performs B nonetheless. Q now seems to be conflicted – was this a lapse of will (akrasia?) How do we account for what has happened? Did Q choose to do B? Why, when she knows that it's wrong?<br /></li><li>Q had no genuine control over her actions.<br /></li></ol>The real one we're concerned with is naturally number 4. Why do I do (or does anyone) do that which disagrees with her own judgment?<br /><br />Are we simply animals? Do we have impossible standards?<br />What gives here.diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6658649732133414052.post-24780033937337076122009-04-29T12:22:00.001-07:002009-04-30T20:33:00.084-07:00Reading A New Kind of ScienceRecently checked out the gargantuan tome (1197 textbook sized pages), <span style="font-style: italic;">A New Kind of Science, </span>by Stephen Wolfram. Not that I expect to get through the entire thing, or even a significant portion of it. But I've been wanting to take a look at it for ages.<br /><br />Loosely, Wolfram intends to present some kind alternative framework for conceptualizing science (and, if I understand him correctly, practically every other field--philosophy, art, etc.) building from the principles of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellular_automata">cellular automata</a>. The main theme in the intro thus far is that simple systems can yield very complex results.<br /><br />That's all well and good, a fascinating project. I have to say, however, that I'm a bit irritated by his style of prose. From what I've read so far, Mr. Wolfram has repeated that same basic idea--"complexity can arise from simplicity"<span style="font-style: italic;">--</span>about 400 times more than he has actually needed to. He changes the words he uses, but essentially he keeps repeating the same idea without really <span style="font-style: italic;">adding</span> anything to it. For the span of several pages he talks about how his new framework will benefit specific disciplines (biology, physics, mathematics, etc.) running through a list with a paragraph for each. And each paragraph essentially states the same basic idea, generically adapted to the subject at hand.<br /><br />Seriously, Stephen. Your book is already an ungodly length without you adding what feels to me very much like pointless filler. I'm getting the impression that he likes to "hear himself write", so to speak.<br /><br />I also take issue with a seeming arrogance Wolfram displays: he can't quite emphasize enough that this is all due to <span style="font-style: italic;">his</span> dis<span><span>coveries and ideas, and this is the first time anyone has approached these problems from this particular angle, etc.<br /><br />Which may be true to some degree. Certainly Wolfram's earlier work with cellular automata introduced the world to new classes of automata that had not been previous examined. But I feel that he relishes telling us about the magnitude of his own accomplishments a little much.</span></span><br /><br /><br />All that said, I'm just being picky here. I still intend to read more of the book, and I hope it will improve as it gets more into the heart of the matter.diotimajshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15147159146635381147noreply@blogger.com0